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May the owner of a controlling block of corporate shares
sell his holding when an opportunity to sell at the same price
is not given to the other shareholders? If he does so, must
he account to the corporation or to the other shareholders
for the part of the proceeds which represent the "control
premium"? These questions are ably discussed in recent
law-review articles by Professor Richard W. Jennings (44
Calif 1. Rev. I) and Professor Noyes Leech (104 U. of
Pa. 1. Rev. 725). These articles marshal evidence of a
trend restricting the freedom ofcontrolling shareholders to
sell their shares. Professor Jennings supports the flat rule that
when control is sold all shareholders should have an op­
portunity to sell on the same terms. In this paper I wish to
examine the grounds for such a rule and to indicate why I
believe them unsatisfactory.
To clear the way for a consideration of the central ques­
tion, it is necessary first to refer to three theories upon
which reliefmay be given against the seller in certain special
situations.
Sale ofoffice.-Corporate officers or directors may not re­
tain sums paid to induce them to resign or to aid others in
becoming their successors. This rule was developed in cases
where no sale of shares was involved, but it has been in­
voked also where an agreement for sale of controlling
shares required the seller to facilitate the buyer's gaining
control of the board by causing successive resignations of
directors and substitution of nominees of the buyer. It is
argued that this constitutes a sale of directorships as well as
shares, and the argument has added force if an identifiable
part of the consideration seems to have been paid for thus
procuring the election of new directors.
Such a case was Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427 (1914), in
which a uniform price per share was offered to majority
and minority holders alike, but with a separate "control
fund" paid to the defendants (and not distributed among
them according to stock ownership). The court required
the defendant to account for the "control fUnd," and the
opinion shows the danger of a separate allocation of con­
sideration for control. It is reasonable to infer, however,
that the consideration was separated in this manner because
the buyer was planning to represent to minority share­
holders that the majority had accepted the same price for
their shares. Such misleading statements were actually
made, and the recovery might well have been given on the
ground that the minority were improperly induced to part
with their shares. This ground is discussed below.
However, in cases where no special abuse was involved,
the convenient arrangement for transfer of control by
resignation and filling of vacancies has not been held to re-
quire the seller to account for a portion of the price on the
theory that corporate offices have been sold.
Inducing sale by minority.-In some of the cases requiring
accounting for the premium, the sellers were directly im­
plicated in representations or suggestions made to the
minority that the price offered to them was the same as
that which the majority were receiving. This was the situa­
tion in Dunnettv. Am, 71 F. zd 912 (C.A. loth, 1934). Here
recovery was given to shareholders who relied upon a com­
munication which invited the interpretation that all share­
holders were treated equally. The court also spoke of the
sale of the controlling shares as a "corporate transaction"
analogous to a sale of assets, in which shareholders would
participate equally. The actual ground of the decision is
clearly shown, however, in the fact that the court denied
recovery to shareholders who made no showing of re­
liance upon the misleading communication. In a related
case it was later pressed upon the court that its "corporate
transaction" theory would justify recovery on behalfof all
shareholders. The court rejected this argument, however,
and again refused relief to shareholders who were not mis­
led. Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F. zd 68 (C.A. loth, 1937).
Negligent sale to irresponsible buyer.-In another group of
cases liability has been imposed where controlling shares
were sold to persons who later looted the corporation and
where the sale was made under circumstances putting the
seller on notice of the probability of such injury. The lead­
ing cases involved investment companies which are subject
to peculiar danger because of the liquidity of their assets.
Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22
(E.D. Pa., 1940),42 F. Supp. 126 (1941). Gerdes v. Reyn­
olds) 28 N.Y.S. zd 622,30 N.Y.S. zd 755 (Sup. Ct., 1941).
In these cases the high prices offered and the buyer's ap­
parent haste to secure control of the assets were circum­
stances held to put the sellers on notice. In this situation
liability is justified on general tort principles. The freedom
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Lectures on Eminent Lawyers
The series of lectures on eminent members of the Bar
which The Law School is sponsoring, and which began
with Mr. Tappan Gregory's lecture on "Stephen Strong
Gregory," was continued during the Winter Quarter.
Mr. John C. Slade, ofWinston, Strawn, Smith and Patter­
son, spoke on "Silas H. Strawn." Mr. Slade was a partner
of the late Mr. Strawn for many years and as such was
uniquely qualified to present a balanced portrait of Silas
Strawn's great contribution, both to the Bar and to society
generally. Mr. Slade's address will be found elsewhere in
this issue of the Record.
Prior to the lecture, which was presented in Breasted
Hall, the Faculty was host at a dinner in Mr. Slade's honor
in the Quadrangle Club.
The next lecture in the series will be delivered by Mr.
Henry F. Tenney, JD '15, of Tenney, Sherman, Bentley
and Guthrie, Chicago. Mr. Tenney will speak on his father,
Horace Kent Tenney, in Breasted Hall, Fifty-eighth Street
and University Avenue, on Monday, April 22, at 8:30 P.M.
Katz-
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of controlling shareholders to sell their shares does not in­
clude freedom to sell to one known to be intending to loot
the corporation. Furthermore, general principles of negli­
gence may be invoked if reasonable inquiry has not been
made in the face of circumstances which would suggest
to a reasonable man the likelihood of such intentions.
In these cases recovery is measured by the loss to the
corporation, although in the Gerdes case the court also re­
quired accounting for the excessive portion of the sale
price as a separable consideration for sale of control.
There are two other cases imposing liability on sellers of
control which are more difficult to classify and which
arguably afford some basis for a broader rule of liability.
The first of these is Commonwealth T. 1. & T. Co. v. Seltzer,
227 Pa. 410 (1910). The defendant was president of a hotel
corporation; he had no substantial stockholding and was
approached by interests desiring to purchase the corporate
property. Although knowing that "his company was
willing to sell," he led the outsider to believe that the
property was not [or sale and then formed a plan to acquire
the controlling shares and sell them to the outsider at a
profit. It was part of the plan that the purchaser would then
acquire the corporate property. This plan was carried out
with the help of the co-defendant director. The defendants
remained corporate officers after the resale of the shares
and acted as such in the sale of the corporate property. The
price paid for the property was "not found to be inade­
quate." The defendants were required to account to the
plaintiffs (apparently shareholders who did not sell out) for
the fraction of their profits allocable to the plaintiffs' shares.
At the dinner preceding the Slade Lecture, Laird Bell, JD '07, Pro­
fessor Soia Mentschikoj[, andJohn D. Black, with law students.
The court's theory was that the defendants had violated
their duties as officers by making a profit in connection
with the sale of corporate property; the stock transactions
were viewed as mere devices to appropriate a part of the
consideration for the property. The reliefwas given "on the
peculiar facts" of the case, with "full and express recogni­
tion of the general rule that a stockholder, even though he
be one of the managing officers ... , has the right to buy
and sell its stock and to keep any profits which he may thus
acquire."
Suppose, however, that the defendants had owned the
controlling shares from the outset and that they had frankly
rejected the offer for the corporate assets in order to realize
more through the sale of their shares at a premium. Would
they be required to account? No confident answer can be
drawn from the Seltzer opinion.
The other case which is difficult to classify is Perlman v.
Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn., 1952), 219 F. zd
173 (C.A. zd, 1955). Here a 37 per cent block of shares of
Newport Steel Corporation was sold in 1950 to a group
of industrial users of steel at $20 per share when recent
market sales had not exceeded $12. The purchasers were
concededly interested in securing supplies of steel in the
tight Korean war market. Steel price levels were being
maintained by voluntary "controls," but steel companies,
including Newport, had found ways to realize advantages
in allocating their production, including interest-free loans
from customers. The plaintiffs contended that the defend­
ant's sale constituted an appropriation of the value of these
advantages. The district court dismissed the action after
trial, but the court ofappeals reversed (Swan,]., dissent­
ing). The court said:
We do not mean to suggest that a majority stockholder cannot
dispose of his controlling block of stock to outsiders without
having to account to his corporation for profits or even never do
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this with impunity when the buyer is an interested customer,
actual or potential, for the corporation's product. But when the
sale necessarily results in a sacrifice of this element of corporate
good will and consequent unusual profit to the fiduciary who has
caused the sacrifice, he should account for his gains. So in a time
of market shortage, where a call on a corporation's product
commands an unusually large premium, in one form or another,
we think it sound law that a fiduciary may not appropriate to
himself the value of this premium.
This passage suggests that the case was treated as analogous
to the looting cases. The court could say that sale ofcontrol
to a potential customer under conditions of shortage re­
sulted necessarily in a sacrifice of corporate good will only
if it assumed that the new management would not allocate
production in accordance with the best interests of the
corporation and would thus violate its fiduciary duty of
loyalty. No reference was made to the looting decisions,
however, and this may possibly reflect a desire to make the
opinion serviceable as an entering wedge for a broader rule
of liability.
The foregoing is a summary of the principal cases impos­
ing restrictions upon sales of controlling shares. In none of
these cases does the opinion argue for a broad rule that the
same offer must be made to all shareholders, and many of
the opinions expressly reject this rule. Furthermore, there
are a number of decisions (in addition to the Dunnett
cases) in which the court refused to make the seller account
for a premium. Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 38 N.Y.S.
zd 517 (rsr Dept., I942). Tryon v. Smith, I9I Ore. I72
(I95I).
The view that controlling shares may have a legitimate
premium value is also illustrated by the decision of the
House ofLords in Short v. Treasury Commrs., [19481 A. C.
534· Here the government had taken all the shares of a
corporation under Defense Regulations requiring the pay­
ment of "not less than the value ... as between a willing
buyer and a willing seller." Holders of relatively small .
blocks of shares objected to the price offered (295. 3d.),
which was based upon stock-market quotations. They con­
tended that the price should have been determined by
valuing the entire enterprise and dividing by the number
of shares. The arbitrator found that on such a basis each
share would have been worth 4IS. 9d. This contention,
however, was rejected. Lord Uthwatt said:
If some one shareholder held a number of shares sufficient to
carry control of the company, it might well be that the value
proper to be attributed to his holding under the regulation was
greater than the sum of the values that would be attributed to the
shares comprised in that holding if they were split between
various persons. The reason is that he has something to sell­
control-which the others considered separately have not. The
contention of the appellant, if accepted, would, as the Court of
Appeal point out, deny him the real value of his holding.
In this paper, however, my concern is not with the
present state of the law but with the desirability of a rule
which would destroy the premium value of controlling
shares. Such a rule was urged by Berle and Means in The
Modern Corporation and Private Property. They suggested
that "the power going with 'control' is an asset which be­
longs only to the corporation; and that payment for that
power, if it goes anywhere, must go into the corporate
treasury." Why should this be true? Presumably the no­
tion of control as a corporate asset is a way of saying
that the law should make it impossible for holders of
controlling shares to realize the fUll market value of their
shares-or what would be the market value in the absence
of the rule suggested. Why should the law intervene in this
way?
The first reason urged for a broad restriction on sales of
control springs from concern over the motives of the pur­
chaser and the type of transactions likely to follow the
transfer of control. Professor Jennings suggests that in the
usual case the purchaser's willingness to pay a premium
springs from an expectation of returns which will not be
shared with all shareholders, returns flowing from private
exploitation of "corporate patronage or other non-balance
sheet assets or from diversion ofprofits in reorganization or
liquidation." The concern is that the purchaser and those
he places on the board will not exercise their management
powers in the interests of all the shareholders and that the
usual rules of fiduciary loyalty are insufficient protection
against such mismanagement.
This suggestion recalls the Newport Steel Corporation
case, in which the sale was to a group interested primarily in
Barnabas Sears, vice-president of the Illinois State Bar Association,
and Stanton Hyer, JD '25, of Rockford, Illinois, at the dinner for
Justice Burton.
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securing the corporation's output of steel and unlikely to
allocate this output in the corporation's own interest. Mod­
ern complexities of business practice and tax law open up
many similar opportunities for private advantage through
corporate control. For example, a corporation with a sub­
stantial carry-forward of income-tax losses may be led into
a merger on terms which do not realize for the corpora­
tion's shareholders the value of the tax advantage which it is
contributing. While the word "looting" is perhaps too
strong for these activities, they all constitute breaches of
fiduciary duties ofmanagement.
Professor Jennings recognizes that the power incident to
voting control may also be utilized "to organize an en­
ergetic and capable managerial echelon, improve earnings,
and thereby boost the price of the stock, to the benefit ofall
stockholders." But he considers that cases of such motiva­
tion are 'unusual and apparently so rare as not to have
weight in the analysis of the problem. This is a critical as­
sumption. Suppose it is unwarranted; suppose that there is
a significant proportion of cases where existing manage­
ment is ineffective and where outsiders are attracted by the
opportunity for profit through purchase of controlling
shares and improvement of management, earnings, and
dividends. Ifthis is true, one must consider the consequences
of a rule restricting the opportunities of such purchasers-­
consequences to the holders ofminority shares as well as
more remote economic consequences.
It is difficult, of course, to be confident of any general­
ization about the motives of typical buyers of control as
compared with those of typical sellers. In the absence of
evidence one might expect considerable variety in both
groups, and it is by no means obvious that potential sellers
are typically persons who resist temptation to abuse their
management powers while potential buyers are hardened,
though sophisticated, sinners. Professor Leech is apparently
dubious about both groups, for he says: "It is still to be
shown that there is inherent virtue in protecting a system
whereby one block of shareholders largely unresponsive to
their fellows is supplanted by another."
It seems clear that a rule requiring the same offer per
share to be made to all shareholders would block some sales
ofcontrol. It is likely that there are some persons willing to
bid for controlling shares who would be unwilling to pur­
chase all the shares. Furthermore, a rule requiring equal
offers will tend to reduce the amount that buyers will offer
to the holder of the controlling block (since it increases
what must be offered to others), and in marginal cases the
reduction may make the offer unacceptable to the seller. It
is impossible to estimate the proportion of possible sales
that would thus be blocked by the rule under consideration.
If it is a substantial proportion, and if cases ofsales blocked
by the rule include a substantial number where present
management is inefficient, the adoption of the rule would
be at the expense ofgroups ofminority shareholders whose
prospects might otherwise be improved. Indirect economic
effects of thus impeding the improvement of manage­
ment might also be substantial.
These considerations should not be treated as negligible.
Cases where buyers are likely to inflict particular injuries
upon the corporation can be handled by a rule limited to
such situations, as in the Newport Steel case. Even if there
are many such situations, they afford inadequate support
for a broad rule which impedes desirable transfers.
Sometimes the case for a rule against premium sales is
argued in different terms, entirely without reference to the
motives of the buyer or his anticipated behavior. Here the
starting point is a general concept ofcommunity of interest
among shareholders-a concept of joint venture with
strong overtones of equality. Such a concept is apparently
implied when Professor Berle speaks of control as a corpo­
rate asset. From this premise ofcommunity of interest, it is
thus argued that, when the controlling shareholder with­
draws from the joint venture, it should only be on terms
which put other shareholders in a position of equality.
This would be the rule in the case of a partnership. No
partner by selling his interest can transfer control over the
investment of his co-partners. But should the transferabil­
ity ofcorporate shares be similarly restricted? It puzzles me
to find Professor Berle insisting on this equalization ofcon­
trolling and non-controlling shares. One of the main
themes of his book is the distinction between "active
property" (property actively managed by its owner) and
"passive property" (held by inactive, "absentee" owners).
Berle criticizes the legal "logic of property" for ignoring
this distinction. He questions whether the owner of "pas­
sive property" is entitled to the full incidents ofownership.
"Because an owner who also exercises control over his
wealth is protected in the full receipt of the advantages de­
rived from it, must it necessarily follow that an owner who
has surrendered control of his wealth should likewise be
protected to the full?" It seems incongruous that the same
author insists that the law should transfer to the "passive"
shareholder part of the value which the market allocates to
the controlling block.
Why should the law impose this particular concept of
community of interest upon all corporations? Such a rule
might possibly encourage investment in small holdings;
but it might also reduce the incentive to make majority
investments. Suppose that the law were to leave the matter
to negotiation between the parties prior to the organization
of the corporation. It is by no means clear that they would
always agree that the prospective majority holder should
forego opportunities for premium sales. Minority investors
might well realize that in some eventualities their interests
might be served by a free transferability which would facili­
tate improvement of management. I cannot find in the
general idea of community of interest a persuasive reason
why incorporation should necessarily be on terms restrict­
ing alienation of controlling shares.
The community-of-interest argument is sometimes
stated in more limited terms. In this form it is an argument
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for restricting sale of controlling shares only when there is
a buyer seeking either all the shares or a "corporate transac­
tion" such as a merger or asset purchase. Here the argument
for "equality" is at its strongest, since equality would be
the rule in case ofa "corporate transaction." The proponent
of such a limited restraint concedes the propriety of pre­
mium sales in other situations. But how is one to define the
situation in which the restriction is to apply? Is the con­
trolling shareholder free to sell only after he has failed,
after reasonable efforts, to find a proposal in which all can
participate? Will the presence ofany such proposal, regard­
less of the terms, bring the restraint into operation? Or
must it be an offer on terms which are later found to be
"adequate"? There seems to me no way of defining the
proposed limited rule which will accomplish its purposes
and yet afford a workable basis for advising the controlling
shareholder as to his freedom to sell. The only practical
alternatives seem to me the general restriction which Pro­
fessor Jennings supports and the rule for which I have
argued-limiting relief to cases of special abuse.
Lawrence Postmus, '59, discusses a recent legal research assignment with his tutor, Bigelow Teaching Fellow David Horsley. Students in the vari­
ous tutorial programs havefreqilent individual conferences with their tutors.
